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Available body of evidence concerning the relationship between insight problem solving
and working memory (WM) is ambiguous. Several authors propose that restructuring of
the problem representation requires controlled search processes, which needs planning
and involvement of WM. Other researchers suggest that the restructuring is achieved
through the automatic spread of activation in long-term memory, assigning a limited
role to WM capacity. In the present study we examined the correlations between insight
problem solving performance and measures of WM updating function (n-back task),
including general intelligence (as measured by Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices).
The results revealed that updating function shared up to 30% of variance with the
insight problem task performance, even when the influence of general mental ability
was controlled for. These results suggest that insight problem solving is constrained by
individual ability to update the content of WM.
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INTRODUCTION
In this paper we suggest that insightful problem solving depends on the efficiency of working
memory (WM) functioning. In order to justify such a hypothesis, we first review the theoretical
models of insight as an essential phenomenon in creativity and problem solving. Then, we
summarize the existing empirical evidence, which is ambiguous in reference to the role of WM
in insightful problem solving. We discuss possible sources of these ambiguities. Finally, we report
the results of an empirical study, which suggests that the ability to solve insight problems may share
as much as 30% of common variance with the updating function of WM, assessed with the n-back
task.
Creativity is usually investigated within the framework of creative cognition (Finke et al., 1992;
Smith et al., 1995). This approach assumes that creative outcomes occur through the application
of “regular” cognitive processes, organized in a specific way so that their final output meets the
criteria of novelty or originality. Numerous cognitive processes have been investigated within
the creative cognition approach, including imagery (Finke et al., 1992; Ward, 1994; Finke, 1996;
Palmiero et al., 2011), attention (Ne˛cka, 1999), executive control (Beaty et al., 2014; Benedek et al.,
2014), or associative memory (Benedek and Neubauer, 2013). In the present study we focus on
the relationship of creativity with a specific module of human memory called WM (Baddeley
and Hitch, 1974; Baddeley, 2002). We also focus on a specific aspect of creativity, namely insight
(Scheerer, 1963).
Historically, the psychology of creativity has been developing within two traditions. The first
one descends from the Gestalt theory of productive thinking (Wertheimer, 1945), according to
which creativity necessitates restructuring of the original mental representation of the problem
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(Ohlsson, 1984a,b). In empirical studies, the proponents of this
tradition typically use the so-called insight tasks, which have
one well-defined solution but involve an element of a “mental
trap” that must be eliminated or overcome (Weisberg, 1995).
For instance, in order to solve the task: “Create four equilateral
triangles with six matchsticks,” one has to imagine a pyramid in
the three-dimensional space rather than attempting in vain to
remain on the one-dimensional plane. Similarly, the matchstick
task, which requires rearrangement of just one matchstick in
order to obtain a valid equation expressed in Roman numeric
symbols (e.g., nonsensical III + III = III can be rearranged
into tautological but valid III = III = III, DeCaro et al., 2015),
needs imaginary transformation of the symbol “+” into “=”.
Regardless of their being verbal or non-verbal in nature, insight
problems usually need active engagement of mental imagery, as
the above-mentioned problems show clearly.
The second tradition of creativity studies descends from the
theory of divergent thinking (Guilford, 1950, 1967; Wallach and
Kogan, 1965), according to which creativity is connected with
unconstrained search for solutions in many different directions.
Ideas generated in the process of divergent thinking differ in their
value, originality, or simply appropriateness to the problem at
hand. Therefore, they must be selected and elaborated upon in
order to find out the really creative ones. The well-known rule
of brainstorming, stating that “quantity breeds quality” (Osborn,
1953; Parnes and Meadow, 1959), also known as the “equal-odds
rule” (Simonton, 1997; Jung et al., 2015), seems to be compatible
with this approach. The proponents of this tradition typically
investigate creativity using the so-called divergent problems,
which have many acceptable solutions and need fluency of
thinking rather than restructuring. For instance, the question of
unusual uses of a brick (i.e., “How many unusual and uncommon
uses can you come up with for a brick?”, Guilford, 1967) does
not have any “correct” solution nor does it need any type of
restructuring. It just relies on the problem solver’s ability to think
in a fluent and flexible way.
In mature real-life creativity both insight-based and divergent
thinking processes are probably intertwined but in laboratory
studies one has to decide on a particular approach in order
to adopt the appropriate research paradigm. In this study, we
decided to investigate the cognitive correlates of insight.
Insight is defined as a sudden realization that the hitherto
unresolved and seemingly very difficult problem can be easily
solved if it is perceived from a new perspective (Scheerer,
1963; Dominowski and Dallob, 1995; Ansburg, 2000; Chu and
MacGregor, 2011). Such a change of perspective cannot be
achieved through conscious effort and planning, so suddenness
is its typical attribute (Davidson, 1995). Subjectively, insight is
usually accompanied with the “Aha!” experience. It is preceded
by many unsuccessful attempts to resolve the problem in the
routine way. Since the routine approaches do not work, the
experience of impasse is inevitable. The period after the impasse
is called “incubational break,” during which no apparent mental
activity is observed, both objectively and in introspection (Sio
and Ormerod, 2009). Then, an entirely new idea appears in one’s
mind, as if coming from “nowhere.” This pattern of creative
problem solving can be found in many instances of scientific
discoveries (Simonton, 1988; Dunbar, 1995; Csikszentmihalyi,
1996). Being a pivotal moment of creativity, insight has been
extensively studied by psychologists in hope of revealing its
cognitive mechanisms.
In contemporary models, the cognitive machinery of insight
amounts to restructuring (Ohlsson, 1984a,b; Ash and Wiley,
2006). This phenomenon can be described as rearrangement of
elements of the problem’s cognitive representation. Suddenly,
elements of the cognitive representation that up to now seemed
crucial appear unimportant, whereas those that seemed irrelevant
gain utmost importance. In other words, a new pattern, or
Gestalt (Wertheimer, 1945), comes to one’s mind, thus suggesting
a new and productive way of thinking. What causes such
a rearrangement is not clear yet. The theory of selectivity
(Davidson, 1995) claims that the problem solver’s ability to
selectively encode, compare, and combine the elements of
cognitive representation leads to restructuring. It is not clear
what is the nature and origin of this ability to think selectively,
although there are suppositions that it might be the matter
of conscious and controlled efforts to process information in
the selective way (e.g., Ash and Wiley, 2006). According to
Simon (1977), insight occurs when irrelevant aspects of the
problem are selectively forgotten, thus making the complex
and difficult problem familiar and simplified enough (see also:
Simon et al., 1981; Langley and Jones, 1988). Another group
of theories underscores the role of opportunistic assimilation
of information (e.g., Seifert et al., 1995). Accidental stimuli
appearing in the environment are opportunistically assimilated
with the original mental representation, thus producing a new,
rearranged pattern of relationships between separate elements
of the problem representation. They may also suggest a novel
solution thanks to the analogical transfer of knowledge (Ormerod
et al., 2006).
Taking into account the cognitive characteristics of insight,
we hypothesize that its occurrence should depend significantly
on WM processes. WM is responsible for active maintenance of
information relevant to the problem at hand. It is also believed
to enable active manipulation with the elements of the problem’s
mental representation (Baddeley and Hitch, 1974; Cowan, 2001,
2010; Baddeley, 2002; Engle, 2002; Unsworth and Engle, 2007a).
Active maintenance is possible thanks to the modules called
articulatory loop and inner scribe, connected with verbal and
non-verbal material respectively, whereas manipulation with
the problem’s elements is ascribed to the central executive
(Baddeley, 2002). If insight amounts to restructuring of mental
representation of the problem, its cognitive machinery must rely
greatly on the WM mechanisms. Restructuring probably starts
with the decomposition of distinct elements of the problem’s
structure. Then, it requires the maintenance of these elements
in active WM in order to use them in multiple attempts to
build up a new structure. Finally, new structures are constantly
built and rebuilt, which is a process resembling the creation of
temporary bindings among the elements kept in the primary
memory (Oberauer et al., 2007; Oberauer, 2009). New structures
typically utilize elements that were formerly ignored as ostensibly
irrelevant or redundant. Since the problem solver does not realize
from the very beginning which elements are relevant or not
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relevant, he/she must keep in active memory as many elements
as possible. So, capacious WM should increase the likelihood of
the occurrence of insight. Moreover, formerly “irrelevant” chunks
of information are probably kept in less active parts of WM, i.e.,
outside of the focus of attention (Cowan, 2001), or even in the
LTM store, that is, in the inactive state of mental representation.
If so, they must be activated and transferred to the focus of
attention in order to be fully prepared for immediate utilization
in thinking processes. Hence, executive aspects of WM, also
called “controlled attention” (Engle et al., 1999a; Engle, 2002;
Unsworth and Engle, 2007a), should contribute to the likelihood
of insight and its quality, too. To sum up, the cognitive analysis
of insight leads us to the hypothesis that insightful thinking,
or insightful imagery, is almost synonymous to WM processes,
as they are conceptualized in the most influential theoretical
models (e.g., Engle et al., 1999a; Cowan, 2001, 2010; Baddeley,
2002).
Available empirical evidence is quite ambiguous in this
respect. On the one hand, there are studies reporting at least
moderate correlations between batteries of insight tasks and
various measures of WM. For instance, Murray and Byrne
(2005) used the battery of eight insight tasks and obtained the
correlation of r = 0.39 with backward-digit task and r = 0.51
with the span task. Gilhooly and Fioratou (2009) also report
positive correlations between insight problems and both verbal
and non-verbal WM span tasks (r coefficients ranged between
0.27 and 0.38), although correlations with non-insight problems
were approximately at the same level. Interestingly, this study
demonstrated that executive control, in contrast to WM, entered
into much weaker associations with insight problem solving, a
result reported in other studies, too (Paulewicz et al., 2007).
De Dreu et al. (2012) showed that WM contributed to creative
outputs in general, and correct solutions to insight problems (i.e.,
Remote Association Rest’s items) in particular. Yeh et al. (2014)
demonstrated that WM capacity helped to solve insight problems
in interaction with attention and eye movements. Arguments for
the essential role of WM capacity in insightful problem solving
can also be found in other studies (e.g., Chein et al., 2010; Chein
and Weisberg, 2014).
On the other hand, many studies report the results that are
not compatible with our hypothesis. For example, Gilhooly and
Murphy (2005), using a painstakingly selected set of “pure”
insight problems, did not observe any significant correlation
with the backward-digit tasks. They reported a weak correlation
with the span task (r = 0.23) but, notably, analytical problems,
which did not require any insight, correlated with the span task
at the same level. Other studies also support the supposition
that WM capacity may predict analytical rather than creative
thinking processes. For instance, Lavric et al. (2000) asked people
to solve insight and analytical problems while simultaneously
counting tones generated by the computer. They found that
engagement of WM through counting did not affect insight
problem solving, contrary to analytical problem solving. DeCaro
et al. (2015; see also: Van Stockum and DeCaro, 2013) go as
far as to argue that “WM capacity constraints insight” because
it leads people to employ complex thinking strategies, whereas
insight, according to them, needs remote associations rather
than resource-dependent complex thinking. It is also argued that
insight cannot be reached through deliberate planning (Chein
et al., 2010), which is one of the vital functions ascribed to WM
(Gilhooly, 2005).
A question arises, what are the causes of such inconsistencies
in the available literature. The answer lies probably in the
methodological weaknesses, which are notorious in the insight
problem solving studies (Gilhooly and Murphy, 2005). To begin
with, in many studies the authors used just one category of
problems, such as the tasks which require rearrangement of just
one matchstick in order to obtain a valid equation expressed
in Roman numeric symbols (DeCaro et al., 2015), remote
association tasks (De Dreu et al., 2012), or compound remote
association tasks (Chein and Weisberg, 2014). It seems that,
for psychometric reasons, more diversified batteries of insight
tasks should be applied. Additionally, the batteries of insight
tasks are sometimes very short, consisting of one (Chein et al.,
2010), four (DeCaro et al., 2015), six (Ash and Wiley, 2006),
eight (Murray and Byrne, 2005), or ten (Paulewicz et al., 2007)
items. It seems that psychometric properties of short batteries
can be criticized, especially if a particular study is designed
according to the individual differences approach. Purity of the
insight task batteries may also be questioned, as they happen to
involve the tasks that can be solved analytically as well (Weisberg,
1995; Gilhooly and Murphy, 2005). Finally, familiarity of insight
tasks is usually not controlled, although prior knowledge makes
them entirely non-problematic. As to WM measures used in the
insight studies, they tend to be rather complex and multifaceted,
thus excluding the opportunity to investigate specific cognitive
processes involved. Moreover, complex WM measures, such as
the span tasks, may be interpreted as proxies for intelligence tests,
since their results are usually strongly correlated with intelligence
tests’ results. Finally, the span tasks refer to the “mnemonic”
aspects of WM, performed by the articulatory loop or the inner
scribe, rather than to its “processing” aspects, carried out by
the central executive. We have not been able to find a study
of insight in which some specific function of WM would be
investigated, such as the function of updating (Morris and Jones,
1990).
Updating consists in constant rearrangements of the temporal
order among the items kept in the primary memory. Participants
are asked, for instance, to recall the last n items of a long list
of elements (Morris and Jones, 1990) or to decide whether the
current element of the running list has been already presented
n items back (McElree, 2001). In order to do such tasks, one
has to revise the temporal order of the list of elements, since
the element presented two items back is going to take the
position of three items back, and then four items back, and
so forth. In other words, one has to keep in active memory
as many elements as possible but also rearrange their temporal
order. The function of updating predicts individual differences
in complex cognitive skills (Miyake et al., 2000; Friedman et al.,
2006; Ecker et al., 2010), although insight problem solving has
not been studied extensively from this perspective. Moreover,
the processes hypothesized to operate during updating, such as
retrieval, transformation, and substitution of elements (Ecker
et al., 2010), or binding (Wilhelm et al., 2013), resemble the
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processes involved in insightful restructuring. It is therefore
interesting to investigate possible relationships between the
efficiency of the function of updating and the ability to solve
insight problems.
In our study, we selected a quite large battery of insight
problems. We also focused on the function of WM updating
rather than using a complex span measure of WM capacity.
Finally, we decided to assess the general intelligence level,
so as to be able to look for potential relationships between
WM capacity and insight problem solving when general
intelligence is controlled for. Apart from being determined
by WM processes, intelligence is by definition the general
ability to solve problems, particularly the complex and abstract
ones. Therefore, investigation of the relationships between WM
and insightful problem solving needs checking for possible
correlations confounded by the general intelligence.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
We investigated 91 male volunteers. Their age ranged between
18 and 26, M = 21.36, SD = 3.62. They were high school
and university students outside of psychology department. We
recruited them through advertisements disseminated at their
residences. One participant’s data were not saved on the disk,
another one resigned before completing the tests. Both had to be
excluded, leaving 89 persons in the final sample.
Ethical Statement
The committee for ethics in studies involving human
participants, assigned by the Department of Psychology,
Jagiellonian University in Krakow, approved this study on
the basis of extended description of methods, materials, and
procedure. According to the Helsinki declaration, participants
signed written informed consent forms.
Tests and Materials
Insight Tasks
In order to investigate the participants’ ability to solve insight
problems, we selected a set of 31 tasks that are believed to require
insightful skills. In the beginning, we gathered all available tasks
reported in the literature, particularly in the works by Metcalfe
and Wiebe (1987), Schooler et al. (1993), Dominowski and
Dallob (1995), Gick and Lockhart (1995), Isaak and Just (1995),
Weisberg (1995), and Gilhooly and Murphy (2005). We also took
into account a 68-item test used in the study on training insight
problem solving (Dow and Mayer, 2004). Some tasks overlapped
across the analyzed studies. Others raised doubts concerning
their theoretical validity. Therefore we decided to reduce the
number of items on the basis of three criteria. First, we excluded
the items that failed empirical verification as insight tasks (Dow
and Mayer, 2004; Gilhooly and Murphy, 2005). Second, we
excluded the items that have been discussed in the literature as
questionable concerning their insight nature. Third, we excluded
the items that were culturally specific, for instance, the ones that
could be solved only if a person would possess specific knowledge
concerning culture, tradition, or religion.
In such a way, we obtained 66 items that have been subjected to
the procedure suggested by Davidson (1995). We asked 52 judges
to solve and evaluate these 66 tasks. The judges were graduate
students of psychology enrolled in MA or Ph.D. programs who
had at least moderate experience with cognitive psychology and
problem solving. The judges were presented with a standard
definition of insight and asked to evaluate the extent to which
a given task complies with such a definition and requires insight
problem solving. They were also asked to assess the familiarity
of tasks, their logical and grammatical consistency, and their
difficulty level on the 1–7 scale. In this way we tried to eliminate
tasks the solutions to which would be known in advance to
potential participants, tasks that would be unclear or ambiguous,
as well as tasks that would be too easy or too difficult to solve.
As a consequence, we obtained 31 tasks which did not raise any
reservations from the judges’ side and whose difficulty level did
not touch the extremes (items with 0 or 100% correct solutions
were eliminated). As to the subjective ratings of difficulty, 11 tasks
were judged quite difficult, difficult, or very difficult (on a scale of
5–7), 16 tasks were judged very easy, easy, or quite easy (on a
scale of 1–3), whereas four tasks obtained the middle ratings of
4. This final pool of 31 items was used in the study proper (see
Appendices 1 and 2 in Supplementary Material).
N-Back Task
Working memory updating was assessed with an experimental
task called n-back (McElree, 2001; Owen et al., 2005). Participants
were presented with two-digit numbers that appeared in the
center of the screen and remained there either for 1800 ms
or until the response. These stimuli were masked with random
patterns of dots. Numbers filled in the 50 cm× 30 cm square with
no apparent edges. After 500 ms of masking, another stimulus
appeared on the screen. The task was to press the space key if
and only if a given stimulus had been presented two (n = 2) or
four (n = 4) items back. For instance, in the following stream of
stimuli: 31 56 34 56 42 12 and so forth, the number 56 is repeated
and a participant is supposed to recognize it as being presented
two items back. Similarly, in the stream: 23 45 34 56 23 and
so forth, the repeated number 23 has been presented previously
four items back. There were six series of the n-back task, each
consisting of 88 stimuli, out of which 16 would reappear in the
proper position. Three series were prepared according to the
easier rule of detection (n= 2), and three series required the more
demanding rule (n = 4). The location of repeated stimuli (i.e.,
signals) within every series was prearranged in the quasi-random
way and fixed for all participants. The procedure started with the
n = 2 series, next it switched to the n = 4 series, back to the
n= 2 series, and so on. Participants were instructed to update the
contents of their WM in order to be able to know whether a given
stimulus has been presented before at the predefined location.
Updating is crucial for this task because of the fact that stimuli
are constantly changing their position in the series. For instance,
the stimulus that is now at the screen has the position n = 0 but
after its disappearance it gains the position n = 1, next n = 2,
and so forth. Participants were told which position was valid in
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every series: n = 2 or n = 4. They were also asked to ignore
stimuli that did not match to the pattern kept in WM in the valid
position.
Two indices of performance have been registered: the number
of omissions and the number of false alarms. The former took
place when a participant did not press the space key in spite of
the fact that a given number had been repeated in the predefined
position (n = 2 or n = 4). In contrast, false alarms were
registered when a participant pressed the space key unnecessarily,
that is, in response to a stimulus that had not been repeated
at all. In this version of the n-back task we did not present
participants with lures, that is, stimuli reappearing in wrong
positions. In the n = 2 condition, they could be repeated
too early (n = 1) or too late (n = 3). Such versions of the
n-back task are particularly demanding for the cognitive control
processes, as they required active inhibition of the prepotent
albeit wrong response. Since we were primarily interested in WM
updating rather than cognitive control, we decided to get rid of
lures.
Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices
For intelligence assessment, we used Raven’s Advanced
Progressive Matrices (RAPM, Raven et al., 1983) in the Polish
adaptation by Jaworowska and Szustrowa (1991). This test
consists of 10 introductory items and 36 main items, arranged
according to the increasing difficulty. Each task requires the
grasp of analogical relationships between abstract symbols.
It allows good estimation of the general fluid intelligence,
defined as the eduction of relations ability (Spearman, 1927).
Due to time restrictions we administered only the main 36
items.
Procedure
Participants first completed the computerized n-back test, which
took about 15 min. There were short training sessions preceding
the proper testing. Then, they completed Raven’s Matrices
(25 min) and Insight Tasks (60 min). They were tested in a
computer room equipped with separate cubicles.
RESULTS
Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1. Both Raven’s
Matrices and Insight Tasks were solved at the average level,
without any indication of either floor or ceiling effects. Mean and
median values were in the middle of the absolute range of results,
which was between 0 and 36 in the case of Raven’s matrices and
between 0 and 31 in the case of insight tasks. Both tests provided
distribution not differing from normal, which was checked with
the K–S test.
As to the computerized n-back task, the average proportion
of omissions was 0.34 in the n = 2 condition and 0.37 in
the n = 4 condition. Proportion of false alarms was 0.04 and
0.11, respectively in the n = 2 and n = 4 conditions. A closer
look at the data suggested that eight participants, whose results
did not differ statistically from the 50% chance level, lowered
the average accuracy scores. Some of them also surpassed the
“three sigma” criterion concerning the number of false alarms.
These participants were excluded from further analyses on the
basis of the argument that probably they did not follow the
instruction or their cognitive skills were too low for the task’s
requirements. In consequence, further analyses were applied to
the sample of 81 people. Descriptive statistics concerning the final
sample of 81 participants are presented in Table 1, too (the lower
lines).
Both conditions of the n-back task differed in difficulty,
which was checked with t-test for dependent samples. For the
proportion of omissions, the difference between n = 2 and n = 4
conditions was significant at the p < 0.01 level, F(1,88) = 7.83.
For the proportion of false alarms, this difference was significant
at the p < 0.001 level, F(1,88) = 39.16. These differences were
expected as confirmation of the theoretical validity of the n-back
task.
In the next step, we checked reliability of the battery of
Insight Tasks. The internal consistency measure (Cronbach’s
α) for the whole battery was 0.62, which is a results usually
interpreted as questionable (George and Mallery, 2003). A closer
examination of items revealed that there were five tasks whose
elimination increased the α index of the whole battery. After
their removal, Cronbach’s α of the battery of the remaining
26 tasks was 0.71, which is an acceptable level of internal
consistency (George and Mallery, 2003). All further analyses were
therefore performed with the use of the 26-item version of the
battery.
In order to verify our hypotheses, we computed correlation
coefficients referring to the main variables of the study (Table 2).
We found strong negative correlations between the number
of correct responses in the battery of Insight Tasks and the
proportion of omissions, both in the n = 2 and in the n = 4
conditions (r=−0.48 and r=−0.53, respectively). Relationships
of the IT battery and the proportion of false alarms were much
weaker, surpassing the level of statistical significance only in the
TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics for the initial sample (N = 89, upper lines)
and the final sample (N = 81, lower lines).
Mean SD Median Minimum Maximum
RAPM 19.81 3.04 20 12 26
20.12 2.83 20 14 26
IT 20.63 3.77 21 11 28
21.05 3.56 21 13 28
OM n = 2 0.34 0.09 0.35 0.07 0.51
0.35 0.09 0.35 0.07 0.51
OM n = 4 0.37 0.12 0.38 0.08 0.60
0.38 0.12 0.39 0.08 0.60
FA n = 2 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.24
0.03 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.15
FA n = 4 0.11 0.08 0.10 0.00 0.38
0.10 0.05 0.09 0.02 0.29
RAPM, Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices; IT, Insight Tasks; OM, proportion
of omissions; FA, proportion of false alarms; n = 2, n-back task, signals first
appearing two items back; n = 4, n-back task, signals first appearing four items
back.
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TABLE 2 | Correlations matrix (N = 81).
OM OM FA FA RAPM
n = 2 n = 4 n = 2 n = 4
OM n = 4 0.71∗∗∗
FA n = 2 −0.08 −0.07
FA n = 4 −0.30∗∗ −0.42∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗
RAPM −0.54∗∗∗ −0.58∗∗∗ 0.03 0.27∗
IT −0.48∗∗∗ −0.53∗∗∗ −0.23∗ 0.16 0.41∗∗∗
OM, proportion of omissions; FA, proportion of false alarms; n = 2, n-back task,
signals first appearing two items back; n = 4, n-back task, signals first appearing
four items back; RAPM, Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices; IT, Insight Tasks;
∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
relatively less demanding n = 2 condition. At the same time,
we found even stronger relationships between the proportion of
omissions and the Raven’s test scores (r = −0.54 and r = −0.58,
respectively for the n = 2 and n = 4 conditions). All these
correlations were negative, suggesting that the higher the scores
in the IT or RAPM tests the better accuracy in the computerized
n-back task. Strength of the observed relationships suggests that
the ability to solve insight tasks shares about 25% of common
variance with the ability to update the contents of WM, as
long as the latter is measured with the proportion of omissions.
The percentage of common variance was much smaller (about
5%) if WM task performance is assessed with the proportion
of false alarms. By the way, these two aspects seem to be quite
separate, since the proportion of omissions in the n= 2 condition
was not correlated at all with the proportion of false alarms
(r = 0.08), whereas in the n = 4 condition it was correlated
negatively (r = −0.42, p < 0.001). These results suggest that
omissions and false alarms, being both indicators of accuracy
in the n = back task, refer to quite distinct aspects of WM
functioning.
It is also worth noticing (Table 2) that both ability measures
were correlated positively at the moderate level (r = 0.41). If
so, their correlations with n-back measures may be confounded
by their mutual influence. Therefore, we computed partial
correlation coefficients between n-back performance and the
IT battery while controlling for RAPM. We also computed
analogical correlations for RAPM, controlling for IT. We
found that all significant correlations remained significant;
however, their strength was a bit reduced. For IT, its partial
correlations with OM were −0.36 and −0.47, respectively for
the n = 2 and n = 4 conditions. For RAPM, respective
partial correlations were −0.45 and −0.48. So, we can conclude
that zero-order correlations reported in Table 2 lost part of
their strength with IT when RAPM was controlled for, and
vice versa. However, the “pure” relationships, represented by
partial correlations, were strong enough to justify a conclusion
that the ability to solve insight tasks depends on WM
updating, regardless of the confounding influence of general
intelligence.
In the next step, we looked at the difficulty level of the
tasks included in the IT battery. It appeared that eight of
them obtained very high percentages of correct responses,
thus not being able to differentiate the participants’ level
TABLE 3 | Zero-order and partial correlations between the reduced IT
battery and n-back performance measures (N = 81).
OM OM FA FA RAPM
n = 2 n = 4 n = 2 n = 4
IT (Zero-order) −0.45∗∗∗ −0.63∗∗∗ −0.24∗ 0.14 0.37∗∗∗
IT (Partial) −0.31∗ −0.54∗∗∗ −0.28∗ 0.04 –
OM, proportion of omissions; FA, proportion of false alarms; n = 2, n-back task,
signals first appearing two items back; n = 4, n-back task, signals first appearing
four items back; RAPM, Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices; IT, Insight Tasks;
∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
of the ability to solve insight problems (see Appendix 3 in
Supplementary Material). We suspected that, regardless of the
fact that the whole battery did not reveal any indications of
the ceiling effect, these eight items of reduced difficulty might
contribute to lowering the values of correlation coefficients. Items
without enough power to differentiate participants usually reduce
variation and thus make correlation coefficients artificially low.
Having removed eight items that appeared too easy, we checked
for the correlation matrix again. The results are reported in
Table 3.
As expected, the removal of eight easy tasks from the IT
battery resulted in strengthening the correlations with n-back
task measures. The correlation between IT and OM in the n = 4
condition seems particularly interesting because it increased from
−0.53 (Table 2) to −0.63 (Table 3). Moreover, this correlation
remained strong (−0.54) after partialling out the effects of
Raven’s scores. It may then be concluded that the ability to solve
insight problems shares about 30% of common variance with the
ability to update the contents of WM, even if the influence of
general mental ability is controlled for.
DISCUSSION
Most creativity researchers agree that insight problem solving
requires restructuring of the problem representation. A marked
lack of agreement concerns the mechanisms by which the
restructuring occurs. Some authors propose that restructuring
of the problem representation relies upon controlled search
processes, suggesting an essential role for WM and planning in
insight problem solving (MacGregor et al., 2001; Chein et al.,
2010; Chein and Weisberg, 2014). Other researchers suggest
that restructuring is achieved through the automatic spread of
activation in long-term memory, assigning a limited role to WM
processes (Ash and Wiley, 2006). The results of the present study
reinforce the view that insight problem solving is related to
WM involvement. Since we used the n-back task to investigate
WM processes, we suggest that the function of WM updating is
involved in insight problem solving. Although n-back, as many
cognitive tasks, suffers from impurity, it is believed to engage
at least two out of three postulated components of updating,
namely recognition of already presented items and substitution
of old items with new ones (Ecker et al., 2010). Interestingly,
when comparing two indices of n-back, omission errors and
false alarms, they both seemed to refer to distinct processes,
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with the former sharing much more common variance with
insight problem solving then the latter (25 and 5% respectively).
Finally, our results indicate that when controlled for IT task
difficulty, a measure of updating function accounts for up to
30% of variance in the solution of insight problems, even when
the influence of general mental ability is controlled for. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first study revealing the
relationship between insight problem solving and WM updating
function.
Let us analyze possible cognitive mechanisms responsible for
the contribution of WM updating to insight problem solving.
According to MacGregor et al. (2001), the difficulty in solving
insight problems stems from the fact that a concrete goal is
defined in abstract terms and therefore cannot be foreseen and
used for progress monitoring. In such circumstances a successful
strategy of problem solving depends critically on applying
maximization and progress-monitoring heuristics. People may
succeed only if, at each stage of the task, they try to choose
a move that maximally reduces the difference between the
current state and the sub-goal, and constantly monitor their
progress against solution criteria (and not against the desired
final goal, which is impossible). Consequently, the critical
component of insight problem solving is the ability to envisage
the situation that will be achieved after a series of steps.
Thanks to this ability, the insightful move can be inspired
not just by actual failure, but instead by the anticipation of
failure. In the formal information-processing model proposed
by MacGregor et al. (2001) this ability was implemented in
a form of lookahead parameter. The suggestion that people
use maximization and progress-monitoring heuristics with
lookahead was supported empirically. MacGregor et al. (2001)
revealed that human participants and computer models spend
more time on solving the nine-dot problem, and its modifications
varying in number of dots, if the problems are related to greater
lookahead.
Building up on this work, Chein et al. (2010) and Chein
and Weisberg (2014) operationalized lookahead mechanisms
in terms of WM capacity. In the direct test of the role
of lookahead in nine-dot performance, using an individual-
differences approach, Chein et al. (2010) found that spatial
WM capacity predicted the tendency to draw lines outside the
configuration of dots, the solution of a hint-aided version of the
problem, and shorter solution times of the nine-dot problem. In
the subsequent study the authors (Chein and Weisberg, 2014)
explored the contributions of WM and attention to the solution
of compound remote associate problems (CRA). In the CRA,
participants are required to find a solution word that is associated
with three stimuli words provided (see also: Mednick, 1962,
1968). Particular solutions can be accompanied with the ‘aha’
experience, or not. Chein and Weisberg (2014) firstly divided the
CRA problems into those whose solution was accompanied by
a subjective feeling of insight on the basis of the participants’
self-reported insight ratings provided. Then, they examined the
correlations between problem performance and measures of
verbal WM and spatial WM capacity, as well as attentional
control (by means of Stroop and antisaccade tasks). The results
indicated that individual differences in both modality-specific
and executive components of WM (i.e., those associated with the
control of attention) explained a significant portion of variation
in overall CRA problem solving and, most importantly, in the
cases when problem solutions were accompanied by a subjective
feeling of insight.
The results of the current study support the conclusion
offered by Chein et al. (2010) and Chein and Weisberg
(2014) by providing convergent evidence based on different
methods, and extends their account by specifying further the
nature of WM involvement in insight problem solving. In
the present study WM updating was assessed with the n-back
paradigm, as opposed to the OSPAN task used by Chein
and Weisberg (2014). In OSPAN task the participants are
required to perform a simple mathematical verification and
then read a word or letter. After several such processing-and-
storage presentations, a recall grid is presented, and people
are required to indicate in serial order the words or letters
they had seen previously. Operation span is determined on the
basis of the highest number of words that can be recalled by
the participant. In terms of construct validity, complex span
tasks have been consistently shown to have stronger relations
to memory tasks requiring information manipulation than to
those demanding mainly rehearsal (e.g., Engle et al., 1999b).
Therefore it is believed that WM span is a reliable predictor of
complex cognitive behavior across domains, including problem
solving, reasoning, and reading comprehension, because it is
related to executive control (Engle et al., 1992; Conway et al.,
2005).
Although n-back and OSPAN are similar in that they both
require simultaneous storage and processing of the material, it
is still a matter of debate whether they reflect primarily a single
construct and whether findings from one of these tasks can
be easily applied the to the other (Roberts and Gibson, 2002;
Oberauer, 2005; Kane et al., 2007; Jaeggi et al., 2010; Redick
et al., 2012). Several recent psychometric tests have shown a
full range of results. In some cases n-back and WM span were
shown to correlate weakly (Kane et al., 2007; Redick et al.,
2012). For example, in the study by Kane et al. (2007) these
tasks shared only 2–5% of their variance. Moreover, even though
both tasks predicted variance in RAPM, they primarily did so
independently, with less shared than unique predictive variance
between them (see also: Oberauer, 2005; Redick et al., 2012).
These results favor interpretation, according to which complex
span tasks rely heavily on executive attention but do not involve
updating, which, in contrast is strongly implicated in n-back
performance.
In contrast, Schmiedek et al. (2009) obtained strong positive
correlation between a latent factor measured by three complex
span tasks and a latent factor represented by three different
working-memory updating tasks (including figural n-back).
Wilhelm et al. (2013) obtained a similar high construct overlap
of recall-n-back and complex span, as well as a very strong
relationship with the latent factor for updating. Noteworthy,
these correlational studies measured WM through multiple
indicators and evaluated their relationship through structural
equation modeling (SEM). Hence, it was possible to overcome the
shortcomings of other studies where WM and executive attention
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were tested with a single experimental paradigm, conflating
variance due to individual differences in executive control with
task-specific variance and resulting in null correlations (Wilhelm
et al., 2013).
Moreover, the findings from our lab support the claim that
n-back task reflects primarily the updating function of WM that
is statistically identical to storage capacity (Chuderski and Ne˛cka,
2012; Chuderski et al., 2012). This conclusion was based on
the observation that, in the above-mentioned studies, updating
as measured by figural n-back task did not account for any
amount of variance above and beyond the variance accounted
for the scores reflecting maintenance of the pattern of a few
items for several seconds (as measured by the array comparison
task) or construction and maintenance of temporary bindings
among perceptually available items (as measured by the two
monitoring tasks). In fact, on the basis of these data the authors
have questioned the existence of a distinct executive function
of updating, amounting it to storage capacity (see also Wilhelm
et al., 2013).
In sum, we believe that the relationship between n-back and
insight problem solving, as revealed by the current investigation,
concerns primarily the updating function of WM. Considering
the results by Chuderski et al. (2012), updating function
measured by n-back task used here amounts to storage capacity.
Therefore it seems that insight problem solving ability may
be crucially limited either by the number of items maintained
in active memory or by the number of bindings which the
individual is able to maintain in active memory (plus possible
interaction of these factors). Presumably binding compromises
storage and vice versa, in analogy to the relationship between
primary memory and secondary memory proposed by Unsworth
and Engle (2007b).
Obviously, on the basis of the current data we are unable to
distinguish between the two aspects of updating: maintenance
and binding (see: Chuderski et al., 2012). Speculating, one can
assume that the maintenance component of the WM can be
conceptualized in terms of the ‘n’ value in the n-back task:
the higher the ‘n’ is, the more items have to be stored in
memory simultaneously in order to generate correct match, and
consequently, the more difficult the tasks becomes. Indeed, our
results revealed that IT performance showed stronger correlation
with the four-back condition of the current memory task than
with the two-back condition. Interestingly, this relationship was
observed only for omission errors. Arguably, such errors occur
either due to a failure to maintain to-be-remembered item in
active memory, or due to a failure to generate proper binding
within a series of items. The mechanism of false alarms seem
much more elusive, as it amounts to “seeing” an item or a
binding which is simply not there, possibly due to some source
of proactive interference that emerges across task trials. In this
case, proactive interference drove the association between insight
problem solving and WM updating as measured by false alarms.
Alternatively, false alarms may have reflected an individual’s
impulsive strategy to overreact (Saunders et al., 2008).
The idea offered here that insight problems solving depends
heavily on maintenance and binding processes corresponds
clearly to the binding hypothesis of WM capacity offered
by Oberauer et al. (2007), and Wilhelm et al. (2013) in
the context of fluid intelligence: “WM is important for
reasoning because reasoning requires the construction and
manipulation of representations of novel structures. The limited
capacity of WM arises from interference between bindings,
which effectively limits the complexity of new structural
representations, and thereby constrains reasoning ability”
(Wilhelm et al., 2013, p. 4).
The current study has certain limitations. In methodological
terms, the most important limitation is that we did not study
insight directly, and more importantly, we did not assess
its critical aspects: impasse and restructuring (see Chein and
Weisberg, 2014). Instead, we used a correlational design allowing
us only to relate such a global measure as the IT index to WM
updating performance. Although the IT task items used here were
carefully selected and judged, it is still possible that IT index used
here conflates many factors. One important factor overlooked in
the present study relates to the characteristics of the problems
included into the IT task. It has been suggested that different types
of insight tasks require different forms of restructuring (Ohlsson,
1984a,b, 1992; Weisberg, 1995), e.g., the requirement for figure-
ground type reversals, the degree of misdirection involved, the
need to redefine spatial assumptions, and so on (see Cunningham
et al., 2009). Clearly some insight problems are more difficult to
solve than others, and this difficulty is affected by characteristics
of the restructuring processes required (Cunningham et al.,
2009). Problem characteristics may also mediate the relationship
between insight problem solving and WM. Ash and Wiley
(2006) found that high WM capacity (as measured by WM
span tasks) predicted an individual’s ability to successfully solve
problems that involve both the initial search phase and the
restructuring phase. However, individual differences in WM
capacity did not predict success on problems that isolated the
restructuring phase only. The current data supports these claims
indirectly, that is, when several IT items were excluded from
the analysis due to their insufficient discriminating power, the
correlation between IT and WM updating increased. This finding
suggests that the relationship between insight problem solving
and WM updating depends on the level of task difficulty, which,
in turn, may be related to restructuring characteristics of the
task.
In summary, our results point to the conclusion that insight
problem solving depends on WM updating, i.e., maintenance of
items in WM and rapid binding of the incoming information
with current sub-goals maintained in WM. WM updating,
conceptualized as the combination of maintenance and binding,
probably allows to form a new representations of a problem space.
Investigation of insight problem solving in terms of updating
function with an inclusion of restructuring characteristics may
be the promising direction for future research on individual
differences in insight problem solving.
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